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Criminal Procedure
By W LIm H. FORTUNE*
INTRODUCTION

Many important criminal procedure cases were decided by
the Kentucky appellate courts during the Survey period-too
many to permit meaningful comment on each case. The author
has selected those criminal procedure cases he feels are most
significant and has not attempted to comment on penal code
cases, most of which involve matters of criminal law.
I.

INTERROGATION

In Denny v. Commonwealth,' the Kentucky Supreme Court
ignored applicable decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and upheld a conviction based on a confession elicited
by a sheriffs statement, "I feel like you have something else
you want to tell me." ,2 This statement was made as the sheriff escorted the defendant back to jail after the initial appearance before the district judge. On the previous day the
defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights 3 and had
4
elected to talk, telling the sheriff that he was not guilty.
During that conversation the sheriff had said that he would
talk with the defendant any time the defendant wished. 5 At
the arraignment the defendant was readvised of his Miranda
rights, and counsel was appointed. The defendant neither invoked nor waived his rights to remain silent and to have an
6
attorney present during questioning.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1961, J.D. 1964, University of
Kentucky. The author expresses his thanks to Cathy W. Franck, J.D. Candidate,
University of Kentucky, 1985 for her assistance in the preparation of this Survey.
670 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1984).
2 See id. at 849.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
670 S.W.2d at 849.
Id.
6

Id.
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The Kentucky Supreme Court assumed the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel had attached 7 but held that

the sheriff's statement was neither interrogation nor a ruse
designed to elicit information. 8 While the Court attempted to

distinguish Brewer v. Williams-the famous "Christian burial
speech" case-the majority opinion makes no mention of three
other United States Supreme Court cases, 10 any one of which
requires a different result: Rhode Island v. Innis," which defines interrogation as direct questioning or statements reason-

ably likely to elicit an incriminating response; 2 Edwards v.
Arizona, 3 which forbids police-initiated interrogation after the
invocation of the right to counsel;' 4 and United States v.

Henry, 5 which forbids the police from deliberately eliciting
information by any means after the commencement of adversary proceedings. 16
Id. at 850.
Id. The Court did not argue that the defendant's exculpatory statements the
day before the arraignment amounted to a continuing waiver of the right to remain
silent, which would excuse the failure of the sheriff to re-advise the defendant of his
rights before questioning him on the way back to jail. Id. An argument can be made
for the proposition that the defendant's waiver the day before of his right to remain
silent was still effective after arraignment. In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982), the
Supreme Court held that a pre-polygraph waiver of Miranda rights was still in effect
after the test was completed and that new warnings were not required before interrogating
the subject about the results. It is doubtful, however, that a waiver of Miranda rights
the day before could serve to waive the sixth amendment right to counsel which attached
at arraignment. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1147-49 (2d Cir. 1980).
9 430 U.S. 387 (1977).

10See 670 S.W.2d at 849-50.
" 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
,2Id. at 301-02. The sheriff's statement in Denny appears to be a direct question
in that it calls for an answer. To say otherwise puts a premium on the form of the
sentence.
'1

451 U.S. 477 (1981).

See id. at 484-85. In Edwards the defendant had asked for counsel. The police
ceased questioning but, after a period, re-advised the individual and secured a waiver of
the right to remain silent and to have counsel. Id. at 478-80. In Denny, although the
defendant had not invoked his right to remain silent or his right to counsel, the court
had appointed counsel at the initial arraignment. 670 S.W.2d at 849.
11447 U.S. 264 (1980).
16 See id. at 269-75. Henry appears controlling. In that case the police arranged
for an informer to share the defendant's cell. The defendant made an incriminating
statement. Even though there was no compulsion, the Court held the statement inadmissible on the theory that the sixth amendment bars police from attempting to get a
person to incriminate himself after the commencement of adversary proceedings. See id.
The sheriff's statement in Denny obviously violates this bar.
14
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II.

A.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution

In 1979, the Kentucky Supreme Court indicated a willingness
to construe the search and seizure section of the Kentucky Constitution independently of the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution. In that year, the Court held in Wagner v.
Commonwealth,17 that searches of an automobile would be governed by rules promulgated pursuant to section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, 8 rather than by South Dakotav. Opperman, 9
the applicable decision of the United States Supreme Court
construing the fourth amendment.

In 1984, however, Estep v. Commonwealth20 and Beemer v.
Commonwealth21 dashed any hopes (or fears) that the Kentucky

Supreme Court might continue interpreting section 10 to afford
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures beyond
that provided by the fourth amendment.
Estep overrules Wagner22 and follows United States v. Ross, 23
the latest in a series of United States Supreme Court cases
developing the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment: 24
17581 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1979). In Wagner, the defendant's car was seized by police
who suspected it contained various items used in an alleged rape. Id. at 355. The Court
held that the subsequent "inventory" search of Wagner's car was impermissible because
police had failed to obtain either Wagner's consent or a search warrant. See id. at 357.
11Ky. CONST. § 10 provides: "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant shall
issue to search any place, or seize any person or thing, without describing them as nearly
as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation." The Court
cited Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1974), which repeated earlier holdings that a state
is "free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than
those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards." Id. at
719. See 581 S.W.2d at 356.
0 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Opperman is similar to Wagner in that both involved the
impoundment and subsequent "inventory" search of the defendant's car. See note 17
supra.
2 663 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1984).
'

665 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1984).

See Estep v. Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d at 216. The Court relied on its previous
decision in Wydman v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1974).
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
24 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970). The "automobile exception" was established in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). Carrollinvolved the search of a car by federal prohibition agents.
Id. at 134. The search yielded 68 bottles of illegal liquor which led to convictions. Id.
Part of the Court's rationale for the automobile exception was based upon the historically
different treatment of autos, as compared to buildings. Id. at 153.
2
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Police who have a legitimate reason to stop an automobile and
who have probable cause to believe that the objects of the
search are concealed somewhere within the vehicle may conduct
a warrantless search of the vehicle and all the compartments
and containers thereof as well as the contents thereof that are
25
not in plain view.
In Aguilar v. Texas26 and Spinelli v. United Statese7 the
United States Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for
determining the validity of search warrants based on information
from anonymous informants. Under the two-pronged test, the
affidavit must establish independently: (1) the basis of the informant's knowledge and (2) the truthfulness of the informant. 28
However, in Illinois v. Gates29 the Court recently abandoned the
two-pronged test in favor of a more lenient "totality of the
circumstances" test. The Court held that a deficiency in one
prong can be compensated for by the strength of the other
prong, 30 and that a reviewing court must accord great deference
31
to the magistrate's decision to issue a warrant.
Beemer v. Commonwealth32 presented the Kentucky Supreme
Court with an opportunity to continue applying the two-pronged
test as a matter of state constitutional law. However, stating it
was "fully in accord with the relaxation of the federal requirements as expressed in Illinois v. Gates,"' 33 the Court overruled
its decisions applying the two-pronged test. 34 The Beemer Court
took the position that the earlier Kentucky cases "did not con-

25

Estep v. Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d at 215.

26 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

393 U.S. 410 (1969).
See 378 U.S. at 114; 393 U.S. at 416.
- 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The Court commented that since informants' tips vary
greatly in their value and reliability, "[r]igid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such
diversity." Id. at 232. Furthermore, the Court was wary of the two-pronged test because
it directed analysis into two independent categories-veracity and basis of knowledge.
The Court reasoned that the two categories "are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probId. at 233.
able-cause determinations ....
30 Id. at 233-35.
3' Id.
at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 419).
32 665 S.W.2d 912.
15 Id.at 915.

3" See id. (overruling Buchenburger v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 747 (Ky.
1972); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1971); and Berkshire v.
Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1971)).
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stitute an independent determination of Kentucky law but were
compelled by federal law. ' 35 By this reasoning, references to the
Kentucky Constitution in the earlier cases must have been gratuitous. The Kentucky Supreme Court appears philosophically
in tune with the United States Supreme Court in matters of
search and seizure. There will be no independent development
of section 10 of the state constitution in the foreseeable future.
B.

Wiretaps

In Basham v. Commonwealth,36 the Kentucky Supreme Court
affirmed convictions based in part on tape recordings obtained
pursuant to a federal court order authorizing a wiretap on the
telephones of the defendant, Shirley Basham.3 7 This case is of
considerable importance since Kentucky has not seen fit to enact
statutes authorizing wiretaps by law enforcement officers.3 s There
is no "law enforcement exception" in Kentucky to the statutory
39
prohibition against wiretapping.
Shirley Basham was the object of independent state and
federal investigations for the same activity-dealing in stolen
property and illegal drugsA° The federal authorities made two
unsuccessful attempts to obtain a federal court order to tap
Basham's unlisted residential phones. On learning of the state
investigation, the federal agents suggested that the state and
federal investigators cooperate. The Kentucky authorities agreed.
Through their combined efforts enough information was developed for the federal authorities to document an application for
a wiretap order to the satisfaction of the federal district judge.
The wiretap was conducted by federal officers. State police were
not permitted to listen on the earphones but were kept advised

Id.
675 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Mar. 18,
1985) (No.84-855).
11 Id. at 377. The recordings also played a part in the conviction of Basham's wife
and son. Id. at 378.
38 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1982) (permits states to enact wiretap legislation
conforming to the procedural requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1968)).
" Ky. Ra,. STAT. ANN. § 526.020(2) (Bobbs-Merrill 1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS]
makes eavesdropping a Class D felony. The definition of "eavesdrop" in KRS § 526.010
(1975) includes wiretapping.
40 675 S.W.2d at 378.
35
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of what was overheard. 41 Based on this information, the state
authorities obtained search warrants which produced stolen
property and drugs. Tape recordings of the monitored conversations were introduced into evidence along with the stolen property and drugs. 42
Writing for the majority; Justice Leibson reasoned: 43 (1) the
wiretap was not illegal under state law because it was conducted
pursuant to a valid federal court order;44 (2) absent express
statutory prohibition against the admission of evidence procured
through wiretaps, the exclusionary rule should not be applied to
the fruits of a valid federal wiretap, 45 and (3) there was no
"collusion" between state and federal officers which would ren46
der the evidence inadmissible.
The majority's treatment of the first two issues is sound. It
is obvious that federal agents, armed with a federal court order,
should not be regarded as being in violation of state law for
doing what the order authorizes. The Court held the federal
officers were "justified" under state law, 47 and noted in passing
that Kentucky could not make illegal that which Congress deems
48
legal.
Similarly, in light of the purpose of the exclusionary ruleto deter illegal conduct by law enforcement officers 49 -it would
make no sense to create a rule which would exclude legally
obtained evidence in state prosecutions. The Court recognized
the concern for privacy evident in the Kentucky statutes making
wiretapping a crime, but pointed out that the legislation does

41

Id.

42

Id.

Chief Justice Stephens wrote a brief dissent in which he accused the majority
of "doublethink," but he did not point out the flaw, if any, in Justice Leibson's
reasoning. See id. at 384 (Stephens, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 379.
41 Id. at 380-81.
4'

46

Id. at 381-82.

See id. at 379. KRS § 503.040(2) (1975) provides a defense of "justification"
to one acting pursuant to court order.
" Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1968). The Court cited United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d
1229 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977), as supporting the proposition
that "federal preemption" precludes states from excluding evidence expressly legal under
federal law. See 675 S.W.2d at 379.
41 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
4
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not contain an evidentiary exclusion.5 0 Stating that it is for the
legislature to "strike the balance" between concerns for personal
privacy and the need to protect the public against criminal
activity, the Court invited the General Assembly "to decide
whether all information obtained by electronic surveillance should
51
be suppressed in Kentucky prosecutions."1
On the third issue, however-whether there was "collusion"
52
between federal and state authorities to avoid the state statute
the majority opinion is subject to criticism. As applied in Basham, the Court reasoned that "if there were no federal investigation in progress and no reason to believe that a federal offense
of the kind authorized for a wiretap investigation by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516(1), there would be collusion vitiating the legality of the
wiretap investigation and the admissibility of the evidence thus
obtained.1 53 The Court emphasized that federal authorities were
investigating Basham at a time when they were unaware of the
parallel state investigation.5 4 The following facts, however, indicate that the investigation became primarily a state affair after
the combination of forces: (1) state officers were kept advised
of what was overheard on the wiretaps; (2) the search warrants
were obtained in state court by state police; and (3) the ultimate
5
prosecutions were in state courts
While it is inevitable that facts will be interpreted differently-"cooperation" to one jurist may be "collusion" to another-the majority's test for collusion affords an opportunity
for state officers to avoid the strictures of state law. In the first
place Justice Leibson chose a word-'"collusion"-which is defined as an "agreement to defraud,' '56 and later stated that
"fraud and illicit activity [are] inherent in the term collusion.1 57
This moralistic terminology is likely to divert trial courts from

1 See 675 S.W.2d at 380. The Court contrasted People v. Jones, 106 Cal. Rptr.
749 (Cal. App.), appealdismissed, 429 U.S. 804 (1973), and State v. Williams, 617 P.2d
1012 (Wash. 1980), in which the applicable statutes contain exclusionary provisions. See
id.
5'675
12 See
.1 675
"- See
" See
"

S.W.2d at 380.
text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
S.W.2d at 381-82.
id. at 382.
id.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 240 (5th ed. 1979).
675 S.W.2d at 382.
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what should be the inquiry-whether the federal wiretap in
question was an accommodation for a state investigation.5 8 Second, the opinion is misleading in implying that federal and state
crimes are likely to be separate. If this were true there would be
little likelihood of federal agents being in a position to accommodate a state investigation. In fact many state crimes are also
federal crimes, and a state investigation can easily turn into a
federal investigation, or vice versa. In the instant case Shirley
Basham was dealing in illegal drugs and in the interstate transportation of stolen goods. This activity was illegal under both
state and federal law.5 9 It is misleading for the Court to stress
the "separate responsibilities [of law enforcement] investigating
federal and state crimes, respectively.'"'6 In cases like Basham,
there must always be a federal investigation because federal
agents will have to apply for the wiretap order. There will always
be reason to believe that a federal offense of the kind specified
in 18 U.S.C. section 2516(1) will be present because the federal
61
judge must find this to be so before issuing the wiretap order.
An inquiry which stops with a finding of a federal investigation
and a potential federal crime is insufficient. To deter state officers from circumventing state law, the Court should make it
clear that a trial court must determine who decided to seek the
wiretap order and for what purpose.
C. Probable Cause and the Anonymous Tip
Graham v. Commonwealth62 and Whisman v. Commonwealth63 are court of appeals decisions arising from the same
fact situation. The cases add significantly to Kentucky search

11Cf. People v. Fidler, 391 N.E.2d 210 (I11.App. 1979) (relied on by the Court
in Basham). In Fidler federal authorities obtained the wiretap without state assistance,
monitored the phones, developed evidence of a federal crime, and obtained and executed
a federal search warrant to obtain further evidence. They unexpectedly found evidence
of an unrelated state crime and turned this evidence over to state police. The Appellate
Court of Illinois held that the evidence could be used in the state's case against the
defendant. See id. at 213.
1 See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1980) (trafficking in illegal drugs); KRS § 218A.140 (1978)
(same). See also 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1966) (interstate transportation of stolen property);
KRS § 514.110 (1975) (receiving stolen property).
See 675 S.W.2d at 382.
6

See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a).

- 667 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
63 667 S.W.2d 394 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
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and seizure law. In addition the opinions are interesting in that
their rationales and statements of fact are different, even though
one member of the court of appeals sat on both panelsA4
The cases grew out of an anonymous tip which led to the
stopping of a car. As recited in Graham, the police received an
anonymous call that someone in a white Camaro had drawn a
gun and that the car had pulled into a Save-Mart lot. Two police
cars went to the scene and stopped a white Camaro somewhere
in the vicinity of the Save-Mart. Graham was driving; Whisman,
the automobile owner, was a passenger. Pills were noticed on
the floor and a search of the car revealed bottles of drugs and
a gun in the glove compartment. A pat down search of Graham
65
produced a packet of illegal drugs which led to his conviction.
As recited in Whisman, the facts are the same except that
the opinion states that the officers arrived at the Save-Mart and
saw the Camaro parked there with two occupants inside.66 As
the car started to leave, the officers stopped it and ordered the
occupants out; the plain view seizure and search of the glove
compartment produced the drugs that convicted Whisman.6 7
68
The Graham court treated the stop of the car as a Terry
stop and defined the issue as whether an anonymous tip can
form the basis for an officer's reasonable suspicion. 69 Relying
on Cook v. Commonwealth,70 the court answered this question
7
in the affirmative. 1
The Whisman court, on the other hand, stated the issue to
72
be whether the police had probable cause to stop the vehicle.
As a matter of first impression, the court assumed the "totality

Judge McDonald wrote the opinion in Whisman and concurred in Graham.
11 667 S.W.2d at 698.
6,

See 667 S.W.2d at 395.
11 Id. at 395-96.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (police may stop and frisk a person
on reasonable suspicion that he or she is armed and dangerous).
See 667 S.W.2d at 698.
See 649 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1983). In Cook, the information leading to the
defendant's arrest was obtained from an informant who had furnished reliable information in the past. Id. at 199. The Court held that the information brought the police
actions within the realm of Terry, rendering the seized evidence admissible. Id. at 20001.
"' 667 S.W.2d at 699. The court stated that its research had found this to be an
issue of first impression, and that it would therefore follow the rule of Cook, although
it did require a slight extension to cover the facts at bar. See id.

n See 667 S.W.2d at 396.
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of the circumstances" approach of Illinois v. Gates7 3 should be
applied to warrantless searches on anonymous tips. 74 Applying
the Gates test, the court found that probable cause arose when
the police discovered the Camaro where the tipster said it would
be. 75
While the Whisman court placed the Camaro in the SaveMart parking lot when the police arrived, the Graham court
placed the car on the streets somewhere in the vicinity. 76 Thus,
in the Graham version the confirmatioh of the tip was weaker.
This may explain the court's application of Terry, with its lessexacting reasonable suspicion standard.
Graham and Whisman are more than a judicial curiosity.
While Graham seems to be a sound application of Terry, Whisman shows that the Kentucky appellate courts read Gates as
authority for the proposition that probable cause follows from
any confirmation of an anonymous tip that a dangerous situation
exists. Of course, probable cause supports not only an investigatory stop but also arrest and a full search. The holding in
Whisman was not dictated by the facts because, as pointed out
in Graham, the investigatory stop (which could be supported by
reasonable suspicion) revealed the pills in plain view.77 The discovery of the pills supported everything which occurred thereafter. As recited in Whisman, the information available to the
officers at the time of the stop consisted of a tip plus one
confirming fact-the presence of a car matching the description
given by the tipster. This is far short of the information set out
in the affidavit in Illinois v. Gates, which included a detailed
anonymous letter predicting future actions which were in part
corroborated by police investigation. 78 The Kentucky court's reliance on Gates is justified only if Gates can be read as eliminating the distinction between probable cause and reasonable

71 See

notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
667 S.W.2d at 397. The search in Gates was pursuant to a warrant. The
Kentucky court reasonably concluded that the Gates approach is not restricted to cases
74 See

involving warrants. See id.
75See id.
667 S.W.2d at 699.
71See id. at 398.
" See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225. Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion,
also points out that "the anonymous letter [revealed] a range of details relating not just
to easily obtained facts ... but [also] to future actions of third parties." See id. at 245.
76
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suspicion, a result not supported by any decision of the United
79
States Supreme Court.
D.

DUI Roadblocks

In Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 0 the court of appeals upheld
the constitutionality of a road block established by state and
local police to detect and arrest drivers under the influence of
alcohol or drugs. 8' In a short opinion, the court stated:
The question is whether the road block was conducted in a
manner not permitting the 'unconstrained discretion' inherent
in some road block situations and condemned in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L.E.2d 660 (1979).
The key here is the fact that all vehicles were stopped. Therefore, the officers did not exercise the discretion referred to and
condemned in Delaware v. Prouse.... 82
Hopefully this opinion will not be the last word from Kentucky appellate courts on the subject. Kinslow leaves the impression that the only issue of constitutional significance is whether
officers have discretion to choose which car to stop.8 3 Courts in
other jurisdictions, however, have concluded that discretion is
only one factor to be considered in determining the constitutionality of DUI road blocks. 84
It is clear that stopping an automobile is a "seizure" within
the meaning of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution, even though the purpose of the stop
is limited and the detention of the occupants is brief. 85 Since the
fourth amendment forbids only "unreasonable" searches and
seizures, the question is the reasonableness of governmental action. In considering the constitutionality of identification checks,
the United States Supreme Court articulated a balancing test for

9 E.g., Hayes v. Florida, 36 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3216 (U.S. 1985). Transporting
a suspect to a police station for fingerprinting requires probable cause; since only
reasonable suspicion was present the seizure was unreasonable. Id. at 3216-17.
- 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1606 (1984).
" See id.
Id. at 678.
" The court viewed this issue not only as "the key,"
but as the only pertinent
issue; no other aspect of the road block procedure was mentioned. See id.
14 See cases cited infra note 106.
1, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
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temporary seizures: "[T]he constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served
by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." ' 86 This three-pronged test requires that reviewing
courts (1) consider the legitimacy of the governmental interest
advanced to support the seizure; (2) judge the efficacy of the
seizure in advancing the governmental interest; and (3) weigh
the interference with individual liberty against the advancement
of governmental interests. Ordinarily, individualized suspicion is
required to support a search or seizure. 7 However, the Supreme
Court has recognized that certain legitimate governmental interests cannot be adequately protected by searches and seizures on
individualized suspicion. In these situations, the Court has approved systematic searches and seizures determined by the application of neutral factors. Thus in Camarav. Municipal Court,88
the Court held that building and fire codes advance a legitimate
governmental interest and that enforcement necessitates inspections based on neutral factors such as passage of time, the nature
of the building and the condition of an entire area.89 The Court
held that building inspectors need not await the development of
individualized suspicion that a particular dwelling has become
unsafe.9 0 The Court regarded periodic inspections as a necessary
tool in the enforcement of minimum fire, housing and sanitation
standards .91
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,92 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a fixed checkpoint on the interstate highway
between San Diego and Los Angeles. The purpose of the checkpoint was to abate the northward flow of illegal aliens. 93 The
Court recognized the legitimacy of United States immigration
policy and the gravity of the illegal alien problem, 94 and found

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
81Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
16

-8387 U.S. 523 (1967).
19Id. at 538.
90Id. at 535-38.

1,See id. at 535-37. The Court further held in Camara that a warrant is required
for an administrative search. See id. at 539.
92
13

428 U.S. 543 (1976).

Id. at 551-54.
See id. at 551.
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that routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints play an
important role in the effort to deter illegal immigration. 95 In
reviewing the procedures at the permanent road block, the Court
noted the presence of warnings, the permanent nature of the
checkpoints, the absence of discretion in the initial stops, the
brevity of the stops, and the absence of search beyond visual
inquiry. The Court found these factors supported the conclusion
that intrusions were minimal and outweighed by the need for
96
permanent checkpoints to check illegal immigration.
While Camara requires that subjects be selected for administrative searches by application of neutral criteria, 97 MartinezFuerte seems to treat neutrality-the absence of discretion-as
only one factor to be considered in judging reasonableness. In
Martinez-Fuerte, all cars were stopped at the checkpoints, but
only a small percentage were waved to a secondary inspection
area. 98 Both the majority9 9 and the dissent'0° assumed that Border
Patrol agents made secondary inspections on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, a factor condemned in Unites States v.
Brignoni-Ponce.'0 The Court's discussion of the point, however,
concludes: "As the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no
particularized reason need exist to justify it, we think it follows
that the Border Patrol officers must have wide discretion in
selecting the motorists to be diverted for the brief questioning
involved." 0 2 Thus it cannot be concluded from Martinez-Fuerte
that discretion necessarily contaminates an otherwise reasonable
search, nor should Camara and Martinez-Fuerte be read as
holding that the absence of discretion cures an otherwise unreasonable search.
In Delaware v. Prouse, the Court relied on Brignoni-Ponce
and Martinez-Fuerte to hold unconstitutional discretionary spot

1, See id. at 554. In 1973, 17,000 aliens were apprehended at the San Clemente
checkpoint. Id.
See id.at 562 n.15.
97See text accompanying note 62 supra.
11428 U.S. at 554. During one eight-day period, 146,000 cars passed through the
checkpoint; only 820 were referred to the secondary inspectien area. In 171 of those
detained vehicles, agents discovered a total of 725 deportable aliens. Id.
See id. at 563.
,o0See id. at 571-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101See 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975).
101428 U.S. at 563-64.
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checks for operator license and car registration. 10 3 While it is
true that the presence of "unbridled discretion" was of primary
concern to the Court, it is not clear that the Court would have
invalidated a roadblock/check point with officers given discretion, as in Martinez-Fuerte, to select cars and drivers for additional questioning and inspection./° Nor is it clear that the Court
would have upheld a nondiscretionary scheme in which motorists
were subjected to substantial delays for insubstantial gains in
deterring or detecting traffic violators.1°5
DUI road blocks have been the subject of a number of recent
opinions from state appellate courts. °6 Little v. State'07 is typical
of the better-reasoned opinions. In allowing such road blocks,
the Maryland Court of Appeals noted the gravity of the drunk
driving problem and the effectiveness of road blocks for both
detection and deterrence. 0 8 In addition, the court found procedures were being used which substantially reduced the possibility
that a motorist would be singled out arbitrarily or subjected to
harassment.'°9 Road block locations were selected by supervisors
on the basis of neutral standards-data on alcohol-related accidents supplied by the highway department." 0 All traffic was
stopped unless congestion occurred, in which case the officer in
charge was empowered to temporarily suspend the operation.",
Field officers were instructed on what to say to motorists and

103See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 . The Court stated that there must be
"at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an
automobile is not registered" before such a stop is justified. Id.
10 The Court stated that motorists are less likely to be frightened or annoyed by
checkpoints than by roving stops. Id. at 657.
101The Court pointed out the need for the state to show the productivity of roving
stops-why roving stops were deemed to be a necessary complement to stops based on
individualized suspicion. See id. at 660.
,06See State v. Superior Court, 36 CRin. L. RP. (BNA) 2182 (Ariz. 1984); Jones
v. State, 36 Caum. L. REP. (BNA) 2004 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Bartley, 35
CRiA. L. RaP. (BNA) 2318 (Ill. App. 1984); State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan.
1983); Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903 (Md. 1984); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 449
N.E.2d 349 (Mass. 1983); State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1980); People v. Scott, 36 CRm. L. RaP. (BNA) 2181 (N.Y. 1984); State v. Olgaard,
248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976).
107479 A.2d 903.
101See id. For example, the court cited a 17% decrease in alcohol-related accidents
in one participating county. See id. at 913.
'0 See id.
,1 Id. at 905.
- Id.
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on what to do if a driver showed signs of intoxication." 2 Interrogations and searches were forbidden in the absence of indi3
vidualized suspicion.'
In State v. Deskins," 4 the Kansas court listed a number of
factors to be considered in evaluating the constitutional permissibility of road blocks:
(1) the degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in the
field; (2) the location designated for the roadblock; (3) the
time and duration of the roadblock; (4) standards set by superior officers; (5) advance notice to the public at large; (6)
advance warning to the individual approaching motorist; (7)
maintenance of safety conditions; (8) degree of fear or anxiety
generated by the mode of operation; (9) average length of time
each motorist is detained; (10) physical factors surrounding the
location, type and method of operation; (11) the availability
of less intrusive methods for combating the problem; (12) the
degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and (13) any other
relevant circumstances which might bear on the test." 5
The Kansas court read Prouse"6 as establishing that "unbridled discretion" of field officers would contaminate a road block
7
even though all other factors weighed in favor of the state."
While indicating that officers cannot be given discretion to
select which cars to stop, Prouse and Martinez-Fuerte seem to
permit the exercise of some discretion after the car is stoppedon such matters as the nature and length of questioning, shining
a light into the car, and asking the driver to perform field
sobriety tests."18
There are two misconceptions about the constitutional requirements for a valid road block. The first is that MartinezFuerte requires road blocks to be permanent, with advance notice
of the site to the public." 9 If DUI road blocks were permanent,

" Id. at 906.
I11 Id.
,,4 673 P.2d 1174.
" Id. at 1185.
116

See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.

, See 673 P.2d at 1185.
"' See notes 99-104 supra and

accompanying text.
See State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d at 394. In Olgaard, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota found all other aspects of the roadblock to be within the standards of
Martinez-Fuerte.Consequently, the critical fact was that the road block at issue was not
"1

permanent. See id.
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drinking drivers would simply use alternate routes. Recent decisions have recognized that the effectiveness of road blocks
depends on the public's ignorance of exact sites. 120 Although
advance publicity serves as a useful deterrent, the public should
only be told that road blocks will be established on a certain
date or dates.
The second misconception is that the state must establish the
superiority of road blocks as a device to catch drunk drivers. In
People v. Bartley,'2 1 for example, the Illinois Appellate Court
struck down a road block because, "there is nothing in the
record which shows that the only practical or effective means of
catching drunk drivers is by arbitrarily subjecting all citizens to
police scrutiny without suspicion of wrong-doing."' 122 In State
ex Rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State,12 1 the Arizona Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, holding that the state
had "stipulated itself out of court" by agreeing that highway
patrol officers become highly skilled at detecting drunk drivers
and can detect many drunk drivers without roadblocks. 24 Dissenting in the Kansas case of State v. Deskins,12S Justice Prager
noted the relative ineffectiveness of the road block in question
as a detection device-over a four hour period, thirty-five police
officers stopped 2,000 to 3,000 vehicles and netted only fifteen
26
drunk driversY.
These opinions overlook the fact that, given advance publicity, road blocks can operate as a deterrent-public awareness of
the presence of road blocks will deter those who would drink
and drive. Thus, in State v. Superior Court, 27 the Arizona
Supreme Court distinguished Ekstrom and upheld a publicized
road block in Tucson where the state showed a reduction in
alcohol-related accidents. 28 The New York Court of Appeals

,10
See Little v. State, 479 A.2d at 914; People v. Scott, 36 CRnf. L. REP. (BNA)
at 2182.
"1 35 CRras. L. REP. (BNA) 2318.
122 Id.
2 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983).
124
2

See id. at 996.
673 P.2d 1174.

" See id. at 1187 (Prager, J.,dissenting).
12,

36 CRim. L. REP. (BNA) 2182 (Ariz. 1984).

Id. at 2183. It was evident, in fact, that the Tucson police had used the facts
of Ekstrom in an attempt to set up a constitutional road block. See id.
12,
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recently held that the state was entitled to the inference that
road blocks were partly responsible for the reduction of alcoholrelated accidents since 1980.129 The Maryland Court of Appeals
also relied on deterrence in upholding the constitutionality of
road blocks in that state. 130
Kentucky state and local police are apparently setting up
DUI road blocks on the authority of Kinslow v. Commonwealth.' To be constitutional the road blocks must satisfy the
following criteria: (1) site selection must be determined by supervisory personnel according to neutral criteria;3 2 (2) either all
cars must be stopped or neutral criteria (i.e., every third car if
traffic is light, every fifth car if traffic is heavy) must be employed to guard against arbitrarily singling out drivers;133 (3)
field officers should be instructed on procedures to follow in
approaching cars and questioning drivers, although it seems that
field officers may have some discretion here; 34 (4) public safety
must be assured by adequate illumination, stopping areas, and
other factors; 35 (5) uniformed officers should be employed to
lessen public apprehension; 36 and (6) road blocks should be
designed to prevent lengthy delays. 137 In addition, it clearly weighs
in the state's favor if the road blocks are publicized, because
the state then can rely on deterrence as a rationale. 38 The
Kentucky appellate courts should recognize the need to expand
Kinslow to provide adequate direction to law enforcement.

III.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

On several occasions the Kentucky Supreme Court has suggested that because of the likelihood of conflict of interest,
129See People v. Scott, 36 C.ms. L. REp. (BNA) at 2182.
23

See Little v. State, 479 A.2d at 913.

' For a discussion of Kinslow, see notes 80-83 supra and accompanying text. See

also The Courier-Journal (Louisville), Dec. 16, 1984, at 310 (roadblocks established in
at least eleven counties, 55 arrests made; Kentucky State Police spokesperson attributed
the relatively small number of arrests to advance publicity).
"I See Jones v. State, 36 Caum. L. REp. (BNA) at 2005 (no proof that the roadblock
was established according to plan of supervisory personnel); State v. Coccomo, 427 A.2d
at 134 (roadblock established on high accident road-reasonable criterion).
" See State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d at 1185; 479 A.2d at 909.
11 See 479 A.2d at 906.
"' Id. at 914; Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 449 N.E.2d at 353.
36 See 479 A.2d at 914.
"' See 673 P.2d at 1185; 449 N.E.2d at 353.
'., See note 121-30 supra and accompanying text.
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separate counsel should be appointed for each indigent defendant
in a criminal case.3 9 In 1977, the Court adopted what appears
to be a prophylactic rule designed to eliminate case-by-case
inquiries into the existence of conflict.14 Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.30 provides that no attorney shall act as
counsel for more than one defendant unless the judge explains
to each defendant the possibility of a conflict of interest with
the co-defendant, and each defendant signs a statement to the
effect that the possibility of a conflict of interest has been
explained and the person nevertheless desires to be represented
by the attorney in question.'41

The purpose of the rule is clear. The Court was establishing
a procedure to be routinely employed by trial judges in order to
insulate convictions from after-the-fact claims of conflict.142 Predictably, since the adoption of the rule, the Kentucky courts
have treated waivers of the right to separate counsel as forestalling later claims of inadequacy of counsel. 143 The Kentucky

139 See Mishler v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Ky. 1977); Ware v.
Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Ky. 1976); Maynard v. Commonwealth, 507
S.W.2d 143, 144 (Ky. 1974).
,40See Ky. R. CRIm. P. 8.30 [hereinafter cited as RCR].
' RCR 8.30(1) provides:
If the crime of which the defendant is charged is punishable by a fine of
more than $500, or by confinement, no attorney shall be permitted at any
stage of the proceedings to act as counsel for him while at the same time
engaged as counsel for another person or persons accused of the same
offense or of offenses arising out of the same incident or series of related
incidents unless (a) the judge of the court in which the proceeding is being
held explains to the defendant or defendants the possibility of a conflict
of interests on the part of the attorney in that what may be or seem to
[be in] the best interests of one client may not be to the best interests of
another, and (b) each defendant in the proceeding executes and causes to
be entered in the record a statement that the possibility of a conflict of
interests on the part of the attorney has been explained to him by the court
and that he nevertheless desires to be represented by the same attorney.
14 See, e.g., Milsap v. Commonwealth, 662 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984)
(obtaining a waiver by the defendant on potential conflicts of interest serves judicial
economy by eliminating a later claim of conflict).
141See White v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.2d 241, 243-45 (Ky.), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 363 (1984); Brock v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982). The court of appeals in Brock, however, voiced its
concern that the defendant was not aware of the consequences of joint representation.
See id. It is very difficult for even a conscientious judge to ascertain that the defendant
understands the problems which may arise through joint representation. Tague, Multiple
Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 Gao. L.J. 1075, 1102-03
(1978-79).
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Supreme Court should treat noncompliance with RCr 8.30 as
automatic grounds for reversal, since the purpose of the rule is
to encourage compliance by trial court judges. 144 In Trulock v.
Commonwealth, 145 the court of appeals so read RCr 8.30, and
refused to inquire into the existence of prejudice. The court
the convicassumed that no prejudice had occurred yet reversed
146
mandatory.
as
rule
the
viewed
it
tion because
In Smith v. Commonwealth, 147 however, the Supreme Court
overruled Trulock and held that prejudice must be shown to
justify overturning a conviction obtained in disregard of RCr
8.30.14s As the dissent in Smith pointed out, the cases relied on
150
by the majority 149 were decided before the adoption of the rule,
and the majority opinion is otherwise without supporting rationale. The result in Smith is clear: a case-by-case inquiry is required
to determine prejudice when trial judges fail to comply with a
rule designed to obviate the necessity for case-by-case inquiry.
In a related matter the court of appeals seemed to approve
the practice of appointing an attorney from a public defender's
office to challenge the effectiveness of representation afforded
by another attorney from the same office. In Milsap v. Commonwealth, 5 ' the defendant was represented by an attorney from
the Jefferson District Public Defender's Office. After conviction,
the defendant filed a RCr 11.42152 motion alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel. The trial judge appointed another attorney
from the same office to represent the defendant in this collateral

'" Cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 468-72 (1969) (automatic reversal
for violations of FED. R. Cpiw. P. 11 insures that guilty pleas will be accompanied by
procedural safeguards and conserves judicial resources). McCarthy, however, has in
effect been overruled by the adoption of FED. R. Cium. P. 11(h) which provides: "Any
variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial

rights shall be disregarded."
620 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
See id. at 330-31.
'" 669 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1984).
141 See id. at 530.
149 The majority relied on Mishler v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 676; Self v.
Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1977); and Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d
174 (Ky. 1976). See 669 S.W.2d at 530.
" 669 S.W.2d at 531 (Gant, J., dissenting).
662 S.W.2d at 488.
1-2 RCR 11.42 governs the procedure for vacating, setting aside or correcting sentence.
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attack on the conviction.53 After denial of the motion for new
trial, the defendant filed a second RCr 11.42 motion, alleging
that his second attorney's representation suffered from a conflict
of interest. The motion was denied, and the court of appeals
affirmed because the defendant failed to show how he was
prejudiced by the conflict. 5 4 In affirming, however, the court
said that trial judges should establish for the record that the
defendant is aware of the conflict and elects to waive it.' 15 As
stated by the court: "In the absence of a waiver, a public
defender from another office or a private attorney should be
appointed. In this way, the rights of criminal defendants will be
scrupulously protected while judicial economy also will be well
served by obviating a later claim of conflict."' 56
In Ivey v. Commonwealth,157 another significant case involving the right to counsel, the court of appeals held that the test
of Henderson v. Commonwealth'51--"counsel
reasonably likely
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance' " 59-applies to retained as well as appointed counsel.'16 The court recognized the logic of the argument that the state ought not be
penalized-through the setting aside of a conviction-for the
negligence of an attorney selected by the defendant, unless the
negligence is so obvious that the prosecutor or judge should take
notice.' 6' The court, however, read Henderson as overruling the
earlier "farce and mockery" test in all respects. 62 Applying the
test of reasonable effectiveness the court concluded that the
attorney's failure to properly argue the Interstate Agreement on
164
Detainers' 63 constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

," 662 S.W.2d at 489.
114See id. at 490-91.
"I See id. at 491.
156Id.
- 655 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
' 636 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1982).
Id. at 650. See also Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984) (test
I5
for sixth amendment purposes is one of reasonable competence).
16 See 655 S.W.2d at 509.
161 Id.
'6 See id. As the court noted, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980)
indicates that the same test should apply to retained and appointed counsel in conflict

cases. See 655 S.W.2d at 509.
163See KRS § 440.450 (1984).
See 655 S.W.2d at 512.

364
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In other cases involving the right to counsel the Kentucky
Supreme Court made it clear that the responsibility for paying
65
for an indigent defendant's expert witness falls on the counties,
and held that the state is under no obligation to afford a
transcript 166 or counsel' 67 to a RCr 11.42 movant whose petition
fails to establish grounds for relief. In two death penalty cases
the Court affirmed the refusal of the trial courts to order the
counties to provide funds to pay experts to challenge the composition of the juries. 68 Essentially the Court held that a defendant must make a prima facie case of irregularity in order to
169
show that a jury expert is necessary to the defense.
IV.

CHALLENGES TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS

Persistent felony offender laws provide for enhanced penalties for those who commit crimes after having previously been
convicted. 170 An enhanced penalty does not follow automatically
from a prior felony conviction; the indictment must specify the
prior conviction, and the prosecutor must prove it during the
persistent felony offender stage of the case.' 7 The defendant
may wish to assert that the prior conviction is invalid. The usual
contention is that the conviction is in violation of the sixth
amendment because counsel was not provided. 72 Commonwealth
v. Gadd 73 sets out the procedures which must be followed in
challenging a prior conviction.

W65
See, e.g., Perry County Fiscal Court v. Commonwealth, 674 S.W.2d 954, 957
(Ky. 1984). The court of appeals has also held that counties are obligated to supplement
state funding of local defender operations. See Boyle County Fiscal Court v. Shewmaker,
666 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
166 See Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 856, 858-59 (Ky. 1983).
167 Commonwealth v. Stamps, 672 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Ky. 1984) (modifying Commonwealth v. Ivey, 599 S.W.2d 456, 457-58 (Ky. 1980), which held that counsel must
be appointed in any case where requested by a RCR 11.42 movant).
616 See McQueen v. Commonwealth, 669 S.W.2d 519, 521-22 (Ky.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 269 (1984); Ford v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 304, 309 (Ky. 1983).
16 Ford v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d at 309.
," See KRS § 532.080 (1984).
1 See KRS § 532.080(1). The prosecutor must also prove that the defendant was
over eighteen at the time of the prior offense and that he or she is presently over twentyone. KRS § 532.080(2). See also Hon v. Commonwealth, 670 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Ky.
1984) ("defendant in a persistent felony offender prosecution must have been at least
eighteen years old at the time the previous offenses were committed").
372 See, e.g., Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967).
:7 665 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1984).
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The defendant must file a pretrial motion in the court in
which the persistent felony indictment is brought. 74 The motion
should set out the basis for the defendant's contention that a
prior conviction is invalid. 1 5 The court then holds a pre-trial
hearing, at which time the defendant has the burden of proving
the invalidity of the conviction. 176 If the defendant fails to follow
these procedures the courts will refuse to entertain a challenge
77
to the prior convictions. 1
V.

MEDIA ACCEsS TO

TRIALs

In Lexington Herald-Leader v. Meigs,'78 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the trial judge in a death penalty case
did not abuse his discretion in closing individual voir dire to the
press and public.'79 While stating that it was not arranging "a
series of hoops for the trial court to jump through,"' 180 the Court
did summarize the constitutional requirements. According to the
Court, if the public or press objects to the closure the court
must provide an opportunity to be heard. 18' In addition, the
person seeking closure bears the burden of establishing the need
for closure. 18 2 Finally, in determining the need for closure, the
court must consider three factors: (1) the importance of the right
which the movant seeks to protect by closure; (2) alternatives to
closure; and (3) the effectiveness of closure in protecting the
right. 183 As applied to the facts of Meigs, the Court concluded
that closure of individual voir dire was necessary to prevent
prospective jurors from being exposed to news accounts of the
questions of counsel and the answers of other prospective jurors

,14
Id. at 918. The Supreme Court held that it wo .A be unreasonable to require
the defendant to go back to the court in which the conviction was obtained. See id. at
917.
Id. at 918.
I"
176

Id.

'" See Commonwealth v. Stamps, 672 S.W.2d at 338. See also Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Ky. 1983); Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 857
(Ky. 1983).
-- 660 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1983).

"I See id. at 662-63.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 666.
182

Id.

"

See id. at 663-64.
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regarding both knowledge of facts of the case and death penalty
views.' From the accused's point of view, it would be an empty
victory if the trial judge granted individual voir dire on the issue
of pre-trial publicity, only to find that future jurors had read
news accounts of the dialogues between counsel and prospective
jurors referring to the allegedly prejudicial publicity. 85 By asking
a probing question the attorney would be supplying the headline
that would affect those not yet summoned to jury duty.
Although its rationale is somewhat weakened by a recent
United States Supreme Court opinion, 86 Meigs is a good decision. While setting out a general proposition, the Court leaves
development of specific procedures for closure motions to the
to defer to the discretion
trial courts, and manifests a willingness
87
of trial courts in these matters.'
VI.

TRIA

In Commonwealth v. Sawhil, 8 8 the Kentucky Supreme Court
clarified the standard to be applied in ruling on motions for
directed verdict. After reviewing previous cases, the Court adopted
the following language:
With the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, if the totality of the evidence is such that the
trial judge can conclude that reasonable minds might fairly
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then the evidence is
sufficient and the case should be submitted to the jury. If the
evidence cannot meet this test it is insufficient and a directed
verdict of acquittal should be granted. 8 9
In another case, the Court held that judges should not give
an instruction which states that "if you find the defendant guilty
,U Id. at 666.
,' Id. at 666-67.
'1 Meigs is premised, in part, on the assertion that individual voir dire was historically closed to the press and public. See 660 S.W.2d at 663. Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984), asserts, however, that voir dire was historically
open, id. at 822-23, and the United States Supreme Court's historical interpretation is
controlling since the closing of voir dire proceedings raises first and sixth amendment
questions. See id. at 827-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See 660 S.W.2d at 665.
660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983).
9 d. at 4.
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but have a reasonable doubt as to the degree of the offense of
which he is guilty, you shall find him guilty of the lower degree." 1 9 In a second case involving reasonable doubt, the Court
implemented RCr 9.56(2), which provides that the instructions
shall not define reasonable doubt: "Prospectively, trial courts
shall prohibit counsel from any definition of 'reasonable doubt'
at any point in the trial. ...
In Commonwealth v. Howard, 92 the court of appeals held
that an absent witness's testimony at a bond reduction hearing
could be admitted at the defendant's trial. 93 The court noted
that if the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine at
the hearing and if the testimony bore "sufficient indicia of
reliability" to satisfy the confrontation clause of the sixth94
amendment, then the prior testimony is admissible at trial.
The court interpreted RCr 7.22 as permitting the introduction
of testimony from preliminary hearings and other pre-trial hearings so long as "the prior testimony is found by the trial court
to be reliable and trustworthy, and the witness was subjected to
cross-examination, . . . provided the same offense and charge
are being dealt with."'' 95 Howard thus interprets the term "trial"
in RCr 7.22 to include other hearings where the witness is subject
to cross-examination. Such a result is desirable-to hold other96
wise would deprive the trier of fact of reliable evidence.1

VII.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

In Burks v. United States, 97 the United States Supreme Court
held that where an appellate court concludes the evidence at trial
"I Carwile

v. Commonwealth, 656 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Ky. 1983).

191Commonwealth v. Callahan, 675 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky. 1984) (emphasis in
original).
665 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
-9 See id. at 323.
94 Id. at 322-23. The court followed Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the latest
significant confrontation clause opinion of the United States Supreme Court. See 665
S.W.2d at 322-23.
M9See 665 S.W.2d at 323. RCR 7.22 provides: "Transcript of previous testimony.For purposes of Rule 7.20 a duly authenticated transcript of testimony given by a witness
in a previous trial of the same offense in any district or circuit court on the same charge
shall be the equivalent of a deposition."
116 A case not discussed in Howard, Commonwealth v. Bugg, 514 S.W.2d 119 (Ky.
1974), interprets RCR 7.22 narrowly to exclude preliminary hearing testimony. See id.
at 121. For a history of RCR 7.22 see Fortune, Criminal Rules, 70 Ky. L.J. 395, 410
n.87 (1981-82).
1-, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
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was insufficient to convict, the federal double jeopardy clause,9
precludes retrial.' 99 During the Survey period the Kentucky Supreme Court applied Burks in three different fact situations. The
three cases neatly tie double jeopardy law together in this area.
Hon v. Commonwealth2 ° is similar to Burks. On direct appeal,
the Supreme Court held that the evidence was insufficient to
prove the defendant was over eighteen years of age at the time
of the commission of a previous offense 2°" which formed the
basis of a persistent felony offender conviction. 20 2 The Court
held that the date of a previous conviction is not evidence that
the offense occurred within any certain period before the conviction. 2 3 Thus the Court held that the fact the defendant was
twenty-two and twenty-three years of age at the time of his prior
convictions was not evidence that he was over the age of eighteen
at the time of the offenses. 204 The Court said the state is entitled
to no inference and must prove age at the time of the offense
by direct evidence. 20 s The Court reversed the conviction with the
26
intent to preclude retrial. 0
By contrast, in Hobbs v. Commonwealth2 7 the state introduced records, apparently from the Bureau of Corrections, which
recited the date of previous offenses as well as the defendant's
date of birth. 2 8 Based on this evidence the jury found the
defendant to have been over the age of eighteen at the time of
the prior offenses and convicted him of being a persistent felony
offender in the first degree. 209 The court of appeals reversed the
persistent felony offender conviction on the grounds that the
records were improperly admitted to show the date of the

M See U.S. CONST. emend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
199437 U.S. at 18. The Court held that in such situations, acquittal is the only
"just" remedy. Id.
2w 670 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1984).
M Id. at 852.
-2 KRS § 532.080(2)(b) provides that in order for the previous crime to qualify as
a felony, the defendant must have been 18 years of age when the prior crime was
committed.
21 See 670 S.W.2d at 852-53.
Id. at 853.
205See id.
Id. at 852-53.
655 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1983).
See id. at 474 (Leibson, J., concurring).
Id. at 473.
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offenses.2 10 Rather than reverse for dismissal, however, the court
of appeals remanded the case for a new trial. 21 ' The Supreme
Court granted discretionary review to the defendant on the issue
of the application of Burks.212 Affirming the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court drew the proper distinction between reversal
for evidentiary insufficiency and reversal for trial error:
In short, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect
that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it
implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has
been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in

some fundamental respect e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection
of evidence, incorrectinstructons, or prosecutorialmisconduct.
When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining
a fair readjudicationof his guiltfree from error,just as society
maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are
21a

punished.

Another argument supporting the Court's decision is that, in
sustaining its burden to prove the elements of the crime, the
state should be entitled to rely on evidence admitted by the trial
judge. The state should not have to anticipate that an appellate
court might disagree with the trial judge's evidentiary rulings.
Hon and Hobbs were appellate reversals of convictions. In
Nichols v. Commonwealth,21 4 however, the first trial ended in a
mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The judge
overruled the defendant's motion for directed verdict and ordered a new trial. There is no indication that the defendant
attempted to prevent the new trial by filing a motion in the
court of appeals for writ of prohibition. 21 5 The state's evidence

210

Id.

211

Id.

Id. The Court also considered Crawley v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W.2d 927 (Ky.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1119 (1979), a decision based upon Burks. See id.
Id. at 474 (emphasis in original).
21, 657 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1289 (1984).
21, "Prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court
from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters over which it has cognizance or usurping
matters not within its jurisdiction to hear or determine." The Florida Bar, 329 So. 2d
301, 302 (Fla. 1974) (citing Degroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957)). The writ
in Nichols would have been premised on the appellant's claim that he was entitled to a
directed verdict on his first trial because the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a
verdict, and therefore the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and the
Kentucky Constitutions prohibited the court from retrying him. See 657 S.W.2d at 933.
M2
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at the second trial was stronger and the defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the state's evidence at the
first trial was insufficient and that retrial was barred by the
double jeopardy clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. 2 6 The Supreme Court, although disagreeing with the de21 7
fendant on the strength of the state's proof at the first trial,
accepted the proposition that Burks and Commonwealth v.
Burris2 8 preclude a second trial if the evidence at the first trial
was insufficient to convict. 21 9 Hence, the Court reviewed both
the evidence produced at the first trial and matters which arose
at the second trial. 220
While Nichols reaches a desirable result, it is questionable
whether the federal double jeopardy clause requires an appellate
court to examine the sufficiency of the evidence produced at a
trial which ended with a hung jury. In Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon22' and Richardson v. United States,222 the
United States Supreme Court endorsed the concept of "continuing jeopardy" 223 and restricted the Burks rule224 to situations in
which the state's evidence has been adjudged insufficient by a
court of competent jurisdiction. 225 Lydon and Richardson clearly
held that the double jeopardy clause does not require a state to
afford appellate review of a trial judge's decision that the state's
evidence was sufficient, before subjecting the defendant to a
second trial. 226 Justice Stevens, concurring in Lydon, argued that
the sufficiency of evidence at the first trial should be considered
by the appellate court, with a determination of insufficiency

216 657 S.W.2d at 933.
217

Id.

21 590 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1979).
219See 657 S.W.2d at 933. In Burris, after conviction, the defendant's motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted. After the court of appeals reversed
that ruling, the Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's decision by holding that the
directed verdict was not subject to appeal. See 590 S.W.2d at 878.
See 657 S.W.2d at 933-35.
21 104 S. Ct. 1805 (1984).
104 S. Ct. 3081 (1984).
See id. at 3085; 104 S. Ct. at 1814.
214 See text accompanying notes 197-99 supra.
212The court of competent jurisdiction can be an appellate court as in Burks or a
trial court. 104 S. Ct. at 3085. See, e.g., Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 44-45 (1981)
(judge at first trial grants motion for new trial after finding evidence insufficient to
support defendant's conviction).
See 104 S. Ct. at 1814; 104 S. Ct. at 3086.
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resulting in a nunc pro tunc ruling that the second trial violated
the double jeopardy clause. 227 It is significant that Justice Stevens
stood alone on this point.
This is not to say that the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Nichols erred by considering the evidence presented at the first
trial. In light of the decision to order a second trial, the defendant could not immediately appeal the judge's order overruling
his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. 22 8 Appellate review
was available, if at all, at the conclusion of the second trial.
The Kentucky Supreme Court's review of the matter at that time
is consistent with the constitutional right to an appeal. 229 If, at
the first trial, the state failed to present evidence on which
reasonable persons could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, 230 then the error should be corrected by setting
aside the second conviction. The second conviction should be
set aside simply as a means of rectifying the error of the judge
at the first trial, and not because of double jeopardy.
Macklin v. Ryan231 holds that mandamus is the appropriate
remedy to bar a retrial when there was no "manifest necessity"
for the declaration of a mistrial. 2 2 In Macklin the trial court
declared a mistrial over the defendant's objection. A juror had
stated to the judge privately during deliberations that she could
not be "unbiased" because she knew the co-defendant's mother.
The judge rejected the defendant's request to determine whether
the jury had reached a verdict as to him prior to the juror's
admission or, in the alternative, to accept the verdict of eleven
jurors. 233 After discharge it was ascertained that the jury had
voted the defendant "not guilty" at the time of mistrial. 2 4 On

22

See 104 S. Ct. at 1825 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens seems to argue

that this result is required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), which holds that
the due process clause requires the state to introduce evidence sufficient to prove every
element beyond a reasonable doubt. See 104 S.Ct. at 1824. This argument overlooks the
fact that the conviction in Lydon came at the second trial, not the first. That is, nothing
adverse happened to Lydon as a result of the first trial.
- Cf. Macklin v. Ryan, 672 S.W.2d 60 (Ky. 1984) (no right of appeal after
declaration of mistrial; mandamus appropriate under certain circumstances).
I" See Ky. CONST. § 116.
230 See Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983).
672 S.W.2d 60.
2 See id. at 61.

13

"I Id. at 60.
2
Id. at 60-61. The Court pointed out that the verdict was never signed. See id.
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these facts the Supreme Court had no difficulty in determining
that there was no manifest necessity for the mistrial as to the
defendant because the criminal rules provide for separate verdicts
in multiple defendant cases. 235 The Court therefore found that
it was error for the court of appeals to deny the motion for writ
236
of mandamus to prevent the retrial.
There is language in Richardson v. United States which
supports the proposition that a defendant cannot be put in
double jeopardy by a retrial following a mistrial because there
is no termination of the original jeopardy. 237 Regardless of
whether this interpretation of Richardson is correct, Kentucky
law clearly recognizes improper termination of a trial as giving
23 8
rise to the defense of double jeopardy.
Commonwealth v. Karnes2 9 illustrates the need for cooperation between county attorneys and commonwealth attorneys.
The defendant was arrested on felony charges and arraigned in
district court.
It is not clear whether the case was set for
preliminary hearing. In any event, the grand jury considered the
case and indicted the defendant on three felony counts. 241 The
indictment was signed by the foreperson of the grand jury and
presented to the circuit judge at 11:30 a.m. the next day. The
district judge, apparently on the recommendation of the county
attorney, reduced the charges to a misdemeanor, and a guilty
242
plea was entered.
The circuit judge then dismissed the indictment, holding that
the district court could exercise its jurisdiction until the reporting
of the incident to the circuit court. If the district court judgment
was valid, the double jeopardy claim would bar further prosecution. On appeal, the court of appeals and the Supreme Court
"I See RCr 9.82(2).
2.,6672 S.W.2d at 61.
21' "Our holding in Burks established only that an appellate court's finding of
insufficient evidence to convict on appeal from a judgment of conviction is for double
jeopardy purposes, the equivalent of an acquittal; it obviously did not establish ... that
a hung juy is the equivalent of an acquittal." 104 S. Ct. at 3086.
-9 See KRS § 505.030 (1975).
139

657 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1983).

m Id.
14, The defendant was charged with second-degree robbery, receiving stolen property
and being a persistent felon. Id.
7A

Id.
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both affirmed. 243 In addition to deciding the point at which the
district court's jurisdiction ends, Karnes is a prime example of
the consequences of noncooperation.
In Jones v. Hogg,244 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus
and remanded the case for further fact finding.2 45 Three times
Jones had gone to trial for murder; each time the jury had been
unable to reach a verdict and was discharged.2 4 When Jones
was scheduled for a fourth trial he sought a writ of prohibition
from the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The court of appeals
denied the writ. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the
denial, 247 holding that neither state2 8 nor federal249 double jeopardy clauses barred Jones' retrial.250 Jones then instituted a
habeas corpus proceeding in federal court.
In reversing the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, the
federal court of appeals articulated a useful test to apply in
judging the "necessity"-for double jeopardy purposes-of a
mistrial order following a hung jury. The court first quoted
251
from United States v. Perez:
"[fln all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of
justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any
verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances
into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act....
They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it
is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would
render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to

be used with the greatest caution .... "252
The opinion then notes that the trial court's discretion to
grant mistrials is not without limits 25 3 and states:

' See id. at 584.
14 732 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1984).
245

See id.

Id. at 54.
24 See Jones v. Hogg, 639 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Ky. 1982).
28 See KY. CONST. § 13.
24' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
-o See 639 S.W.2d at 544-45.
2'122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 194 (1824).
212 See 732 F.2d at 55 (quoting 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195).
2

253

See

id.
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In determining whether sound discretion has been exercised,
several factors must be considered. These factors include: (1)
a timely objection by the defendant; (2) the jury's collective
opinion that it cannot agree on a verdict; (3) the length of the
jury deliberations; (4) the length of the trial; (5) the complexity
of the issues presented to the jury; (6) any proper communication which the judge has with the jury; (7) the effects of
possible exhaustion and the impact which coercion of further
deliberations might have on the verdict; and (8) the trial judge's
belief that additional prosecutions will result in continued hung
4
juries.
The Federal court of appeals noted that the Kentucky Supreme Court had apparently misunderstood the Perez rule. 25
The Kentucky opinion states that the issue is "whether

. .

.there

is a manifest necessity for invoking the defense of double jeopardy. '256 The question, of course, is whether there is a manifest
necessity for declaring a mistrial, not whether there is a necessity
25 7
for invoking double jeopardy.
While Jones involved a man who had been tried three times
without conviction, the test set out is applicable to the common
situation of a retrial after a single hung jury. Trial judges should
carefully consider the factors set out in Jones before declaring
a mistrial over the defendant's objection.

' Id. at 56. Cf. Rogers v. United States, 609 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1979).
" See 732 F.2d at 56.
2,6 639 S.W.2d at 544.
257 See 732 F.2d at 56.

